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Blunt the Violence: How Legal Marijuana 
Regulation in the United States Can Help End the 
Cartel Violence in Mexico 
Andrés E. Muñoz* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few people know of the fear and violence that currently plagues Mexico 
better than Cristina Roman. When asked how the drug war violence in 
Juarez, Mexico, invaded her own life, Ms. Roman responded, “How far 
should I go back?” She began her account in May 2010 when, at four in the 
morning, gunmen invaded her household, which included her husband and 
three children.1 She hid with her children, but the gunmen ordered her to 
come out and when she did, she was thrown to the floor as the men pistol-
whipped her husband.2 They then asked for money, jewelry, and anything 
else they wanted.3 After the gunmen told Ms. Roman to hide back with her 
kids, they beat her husband for another 30 minutes.4  After the beating 
                                                                                                                     
* Andrés E. Muñoz is a 2015 JD candidate from Seattle University School of Law. He 
graduated from the University of Washington in 2012 with BAs in History and Latin 
American & Caribbean Studies. He gives a special thanks to his friends, family, 
professors, and Seattle Journal for Social Justice staff for inspiring him to write on this 
important topic. He would especially like to thank Stacy Smith and Quinn Dennehy for 
helping him polish this work to be ready for publication, Professor Bender for offering 
his expertise and suggestions on this topic, and Leticia Hernandez, his partner, for always 
being there to bounce ideas off of and for supporting him through the process of writing 
this article. 
1 Daniel Hernandez, Mexican Drug War’s Innocent Victims: ‘They Tried to Kill Me 
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ceased, Ms. Roman came out to find that her husband was missing.5 Two 
hours later, her brother-in-law received a phone call with ransom 
instructions.6 
Over the next two days, Ms. Roman and her brother-in-law sold her 
husband’s used car dealership, liquidated his assets, and raised funds to pay 
off the ransom.7 The kidnappers were supposed to return her husband on the 
third day; rather, on the fourth day, they threw his dead body in the street.8 
Sadly, Ms. Roman’s story does not end here. Overnight, she went from 
being a stay-at-home mom to the sole breadwinner for the family with a job 
at a nightclub. 9  While working one night, federal police entered the 
nightclub, ordered everyone to line up against the wall, and searched for 
weapons, violating women in the process.10 A few minutes later, the police 
left and two men with automatic weapons entered and opened fire in the 
club—killing everyone they could.11 Afterwards, the two men lit the place 
on fire.12 
Incredibly, Ms. Roman was able to escape the massacre, but the assassins 
were still out to get her and the other survivors of the shooting.13 At one 
point they even tried to run Ms. Roman off the freeway while she was 
driving with her kids.14 Managing to escape that situation, she applied for 
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Ms. Roman’s grim story gives one account of the atrocious and fearsome 
violence that takes place on a daily basis in Mexico and that has been 
occurring for at least the past eight years.16 The violence is part of a bloody 
drug war that has taken place since 2006 between the Mexican government 
and the powerful drug cartels that make enormous profits by trafficking 
illegal drugs to the United States. These cartels make between $19–$29 
billion annually, making drug trafficking one of the most lucrative 
industries in Mexico. 17  It is estimated that over 70,000 people have died as 
a result of the nine-plus years of conflict.18 This estimate does not include 
the 40,000 US residents that die each year due to the illegal drug use that is 
made possible by the cartels.19 In addition, according to one estimate, more 
than 26,000 people have disappeared,20 a staggering number attributed to 
both the cartels and to the Mexican government as part of its efforts to 
combat the cartels through the use of violent tactics.21 
The amount of illegal drug use in the United States is the driving force of 
cartel power. In some respects, the United States is the perfect neighbor for 
drug cartels because the country has a “high demand for drugs, a 
sophisticated transportation network, a variety of places where drugs can be 
                                                                                                                     
16 Carrie F. Cordero, Breaking the Mexican Cartels: A Key Homeland Security 
Challenge for the Next Four Years, 81 UMKC L. REV. 289, 292–94 (2012). 
17 GRAYING G. WILLIAMS & JOHN MORTON, Joint Message from Assistant Secretary 
John Morton, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Director Grayling G. 
Williams, DHS Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA–MEXICO: BI-NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDS 
STUDY (2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/cornerstone/pdf/cps-study.pdf. 
18 Tracy Wilkinson, Mexico Cartel Leader’s Capture Will Have Little Effect on Drug 
Flow, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/16/ 
world/la-fg-mexico-trevino-20130717. 
19 See Cordero, supra note 16, at 289. 
20 Catherine E. Shoichet, Mexico Reports More Than 26,000 Missing, CNN, http://www. 
cnn.com/2013/02/26/world/americas/mexico-disappeared/index.html (last updated Feb. 
27, 2013, 8:00 AM). 
21 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: MEXICO 246 (2013), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/mexico. 
694 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
grown and manufactured, a vulnerable southwest border, and a population 
that is mostly unaware of the extent of the infestation.”22 How, then, can the 
United States provide a means to an end of these dangerous cartels or a 
means to completely dismantle cartel power? The goal of this paper is to 
provide a possible answer to that question. 
Understanding the drug war in Mexico is a complex study that requires a 
strong historical grasp of drug trafficking in Mexico and an in-depth 
analysis of how globalization, through neoliberal policies and ideologies, 
has facilitated this violent war in Mexico. A well-rounded understanding of 
the drug war is beyond the scope of this article. Rather, this article focuses 
primarily on the cartels’ reliance on the illegal trafficking of marijuana to 
the United States and draws on research to give a clearer understanding of 
how marijuana impacts cartel business. Additionally, this article ties the 
cartels’ marijuana business with the United States and the current 
movement to legalize marijuana’s recreational use. This article explains 
how marijuana legalization can potentially lead to a decrease in cartel 
power and hence, a decrease in the violence that plagues Mexico. However, 
the legalization of marijuana in the United States alone is not enough to put 
a halt to the illegal trafficking of marijuana to the United States. This paper 
argues that laws and policies legalizing marijuana need to be constructed in 
ways that will drive drug cartels out of business, at least out of the 
marijuana business. 
Tight restrictions, high taxes, caps on marijuana (such as those in 
Washington and Colorado), and state and federal conflicts limit the ability 
for US businesses to grow and expand to an extent that could completely 
replace marijuana provided by cartels. Like any business, the emerging 
legal marijuana businesses must be able to compete with illegal marijuana 
                                                                                                                     
22 SYLVIA LONGMIRE, CARTEL: THE COMING INVASION OF MEXICO’S DRUG WARS 12 
(2011). 
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businesses in order to replace them. Displacing the cartel marijuana 
businesses in the United States with legal domestic businesses would be a 
huge loss to the cartels and would likely shrink their influence and 
hopefully lead to an end of cartel violence. It is important that US policy 
makers, voters, and residents consider what is going on in Mexico, because 
this is a human rights issue that affects not only the United States’ next door 
neighbor, but also US citizens and residents alike who have family, friends, 
and loved ones victimized by the violence. 
The topic of marijuana in the United States is the center of much debate 
and controversy as there have been large movements in recent years to not 
only decriminalize its use generally, but also specifically legalize its 
recreational use. Currently in the United States, the movement to legalize 
both the medical and recreational use of marijuana is gaining momentum as 
can be seen by recent legislation legalizing the use of recreational marijuana 
in Washington and Colorado in 2012, and Oregon, Alaska, and the District 
of Columbia in 2014.23 This recent legislation is profound in US history 
because a movement like this was likely unimaginable even 20 years ago. 
This movement, however, is still young, and many states and the federal 
government refuse to even consider this type of legislation for a variety of 
reasons. Due to its current criminalized status in much of the country, 
marijuana continues to be one of the most illegally smuggled drugs into the 
United States from Mexico, which provides a strong economic base for 
Mexican cartels.24 
If more states, and possibly the federal government, followed in 
Washington’s and Colorado’s footsteps by legalizing marijuana’s 
recreational use, a dwindling of cartel funding and business would likely 
                                                                                                                     
23 Initiative 502 in Washington; Amendment 64 in Colorado; Measure 91 in Oregon, 
Ballot Measure 2 in Alaska; Initiative 71 in the District of Columbia. 
24 See CNN Library, Mexico Drug War Fast Facts, CNN WORLD, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2013/09/02/world/americas/mexico-drug-war-fast-facts/ (last updated Mar. 15, 2014 9:29 
AM). 
696 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
result. This reduction of cartel power would severely damage cartels’ efforts 
and possibly lead to an end of the widespread violence in Mexico. As stated 
above, however, this can only happen if the laws legalizing marijuana can 
effectively drive down cartel influence. This article examines how the 
current laws in Washington and Colorado could drive out cartel business 
and how a few modifications to state and federal policies can further reduce 
cartel influence and violence. Although Oregon, Alaska, and the District of 
Columbia have passed recreational marijuana laws, this article focuses 
primarily on the Washington and Colorado laws because more research has 
been done on these laws as they have been around longer. 
This article is broken up into four main parts with Part I serving as the 
introduction. Part II focuses on the drug war in Mexico, providing an 
overview of how the drug war came to be through a brief look at the 
economic and political climate that led to the current crisis. This is followed 
by an examination of the current situation, looking at the current demand 
for drugs in the United States that serves as the driving economic force for 
cartels. Additionally, this section looks at the cartel power structures in 
Mexico that compete directly against those of the Mexican government, 
which leads to the violence. This section also looks at how the United 
States, by providing military assistance to the Mexican government in 
combination with lax US gun laws, has exacerbated the violence. Lastly, 
this section looks at the bleak future of violence in Mexico. 
Part III looks into the movement to legalize marijuana in the United 
States. This section begins with a brief overview of marijuana’s historical 
criminalization through the War on Drugs. This is followed by an analysis 
of the reasons why Washington and Colorado legalized marijuana, by 
looking at marijuana’s gradual decriminalization, the widespread popularity 
of its medical use throughout the country, and the ways that the official and 
popular opinions have drastically shifted over the years with regard to its 
use. 
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Part IV examines Washington’s Initiative 502 (I-502) and Colorado’s 
Amendment 64 to see which parts of these laws could keep the cartels in 
business through difficult licensing procedures, high taxes, and caps on 
marijuana sales. Additionally, this section explains how the uncertainty 
between conflicting state and federal laws serves as another obstacle for 
emerging legal marijuana businesses. This section suggests that states 
should loosen some of their licensing requirements, increase the number of 
licenses granted, and lower the overall tax rate on marijuana. These changes 
would allow legal marijuana business to be more competitive against the 
cartels. This section also suggests that marijuana should be rescheduled 
from its current status as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substance 
Act, that an exemption should be created allowing for states that have 
legalized marijuana to not be threatened by federal intervention, and that the 
president should consider implementing executive orders to realize the 
above suggestions. 
II. THE PROBLEM IN MEXICO 
The problem of violence in Mexico has placed the people of Mexico in a 
state of fear and uncertainty. This section puts this bleak sentiment into 
context by examining the historical and economic forces along with 
militaristic policies of both the United States and Mexico that have created 
a climate of violence. 
A. Brief Background of the Political and Economic Climate Leading to the 
Violence 
Recent cartel violence in Mexico can be traced to the election of Vicente 
Fox in 2000 under the National Action Party (PAN). This was a 
monumental change in power because it represented the end of a 71-year 
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reign of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),25 which developed a 
reputation for corruption and authoritarianism. 26  However, the PRI also 
developed a masterful hand in dealing with the existing cartels, often by 
taking down a few token gangsters and taxing the rest, but allowing them to 
operate nonetheless.27 The switch of power from the PRI to the PAN was 
popular among Mexican voters as it brought hope that corruption would be 
eradicated and that democracy would finally be practiced in Mexico.28 
However, the newly elected political party did not have such a firm 
handle on the cartels—leading to the first serious violent outbreak of war on 
the Texas-Mexico border in 2004. 29  President Fox’s successor, Felipe 
Calderón, who became president in 2006 under the same party, launched the 
full-out drug war on the increasingly powerful criminal organizations 
through force, 30  rather than address the situation through reforming 
Mexico’s flawed enforcement agencies. 31  In the first four years of his 
presidency, an estimated 34 thousand lives were lost. 32  The number of 
public officials who died during this four-year period is significant, 
amounting to over 25 hundred public officials including police officers, 
soldiers, judges, mayors, and other federal officials.33 This fact reflects that 
                                                                                                                     
25 Taylor Morris, Mexico’s PRI: Repeating History or Looking Forward?, HARV. POL. 
REV. (Sept. 1, 2012, 3:07 PM), http://harvardpolitics.com/world/mexicos-pri-repeating-
history-or-looking-forward/. 
26 IOAN GRILLO, EL NARCO: INSIDE MEXICO’S CRIMINAL INSURGENCY 10 (2011). 
27 Id. 
28 See id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY: KILLINGS, TORTURE, AND 
DISAPPEARANCES IN MEXICO’S “WAR ON DRUGS” 4 (2011), available at http://www.hrw 
.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf. 
32 GRILLO, supra note 26, at 10. 
33 Id. at 11. 
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much of the violence was due, in part, to a struggle for societal power in 
cartel-ridden regions.34 
Free trade policies also set the stage for cartel control to escalate in 
Mexico. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represented 
the formal breaking down of trade barriers between Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico, allowing goods to flow through the countries without 
any restrictions. 35  Although NAFTA may have furthered US business 
interests, it also furthered illegitimate business interests, such as those of 
drug cartels.36 One of its devastating effects on Mexico is that it left many 
workers jobless because they could not compete with US producers and 
earn a livable wage.37 The influx of US-grown agricultural products, which 
are mass-produced and exported to Mexico, has flooded the Mexican 
market, making US-grown goods cheaper than Mexican-grown goods38 sold 
within Mexico.39 As a result, farmers—consisting of young men—are left 
jobless, leading to more young men that are eager to make any sort of 
living. These young men then become easy targets for cartels that are 
                                                                                                                     
34 Id. 
35 Kimberly Amadeo, Advantages of NAFTA, ABOUTNEWS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://use 
conomy.about.com/od/tradepolicy/p/NAFTA_Advantage.htm. 
36 Ryan Grim, NAFTA and the Drug Cartels: “A Deal Made in Narco Heaven,” 
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ryan-
grim/nafta-and-the-drug-cartel_b_223705.html. 
37 See Gabrielle D. Schneck, A War on Civilians: Disaster Capitalism and the Drug War 
in Mexico, 10 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 927, 957–59 (2012). 
38 One of the best examples of a Mexican agricultural industry that was devastated by 
NAFTA is the corn industry. After the implementation of NAFTA, Mexican farmers that 
lived off the corn they grew and sold locally were driven out of business when cheap 
American corn from the United States flooded the Mexican market, selling at cheaper 
prices. Laura Carlsen, Under NAFTA, Mexico Suffered, and the United States felt its 
Pain, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2013, 5:11 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/ 
2013/11/24/what-weve-learned-from-nafta/under-nafta-mexico-suffered-and-the-united-
states-felt-its-pain 
39 See Susana G. Baumann, Mexican Farmers Affected By Agricultural Subsidies From 
NAFTA, Other International Agreement, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 11, 2013, http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/11/mexican-farmers-agricultural-subsidies_n_2457845.htm 
l#slide=1627659. 
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hungry for foot soldiers. Policies such as NAFTA help explain the major 
role that the United States has played in setting the stage for the bloody 
drug war. 
B. The United States’ Role in the Violence in Mexico 
In order to better understand why the legalization of marijuana in the 
United States stands out as a viable solution to the violence in Mexico, one 
ought to examine how current policies in the United States add to the 
violence in Mexico. Without the demand in the United States for illegal 
drugs, the military aid the United States currently provides to Mexico, and 
the free flow of guns into Mexico from the United States, the widespread 
violence would likely not exist. 
1. Demand for Illegal Drugs in the United States Fuels Cartels 
The driving force of cartel power is the demand for drugs in the United 
States. People in the United States spend approximately $65 billion a year 
on illegal drugs, and drug-related damages amount to about $110 billion per 
year.40 A report by the US Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control 
published in 2012 stated that about 22.6 million people in the United States 
over the age of 12 were illegal drug users, accounting for almost nine 
percent of the population and representing the largest proportion in the past 
decade.41 Of all illegal drugs used in the United States, marijuana places 
first, representing over 60 percent of all illegal drug use with 17.4 million 
users in 2010, followed by 7 million psychotherapeutic users, 1.5 million 
cocaine users, 1.2 million hallucinogen users, 0.7 million inhalant users, and 
                                                                                                                     
40 Drug Demand Sparks Drug War Debate, ABC NEWS (March 16, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=131177. 
41 U.S. SENATE CAUCUS ON INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL, 112TH CONG., REDUCING THE 
U.S. DEMAND FOR ILLEGAL DRUGS 12 (Comm. Print 2012), available at http://www.fein 
stein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=81b53476-64a3-4088-9bae-254a8 
4b95ddb. 
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0.2 million heroin users.42 Thus this article focuses on how current and up-
and-coming laws that legalize recreational marijuana can be tailored to 
drive the cartels out of business. 
The Senate Caucus also found that “[m]ost Americans are unaware of the 
impact that illegal drug consumption has in fomenting violence in drug 
trafficking countries in Latin America[,]” citing Mexico as an example.43 
During her term as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton stated that in the 
United States, “[o]ur insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug 
trade.”44 She also stated, “We know very well that the drug traffickers are 
motivated by the demand for illegal drugs in the United States and that they 
are armed by the transport of weapons from the United States.”45 Clinton’s 
comments appear to be the first comments made by a public official of her 
capacity that admitted that the United States is largely responsible for the 
violence in Mexico. It is clear from the abovementioned statistics and the 
statements made by Hillary Clinton that the enormous demand for illegal 
drugs in the United States fuels Mexican drug cartels. Although most legal, 
academic, and media sources differ as to how the drug problem in the 
United States should be solved, it appears that most sources agree that it is a 
problem that needs to be resolved, not just by tackling the drug abuse 
problem in the United States, but also by ending the demand for drugs that 
provide the cartels with a means to exist. 
                                                                                                                     
42 Id. at 13. 
43 Id. at 7. 
44 Mary Beth Sheridan, Clinton: U.S. Policies Failed, Fueled Mexico’s Drug War, 
WASH. POST (March 26, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article 
/2009/03/25/AR2009032501034.html. 
45 Jo Tuckman, Hilary Clinton Admits US Role in Mexico Drug Wars, THE GUARDIAN 
(March 26, 2009, 5:39 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/26/mexico-
hillary-clinton-drugs-weapons. 
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2. US Military Assistance Escalates Violence  
Thus far, the United States’ strategy for helping Mexico tackle the cartel 
problem has been a militaristic approach. The United States has recognized 
a need to assist Mexico, but rather than spending resources to tackle the 
problem of demand, the United States has allocated resources to battle the 
cartels with violence by supplying military equipment to the Mexican 
government. 
The Mérida Initiative, also known as “Plan Mexico,” launched shortly 
after President Calderón took office in Mexico to serve as a partnership 
between the United States and Mexico to “fight organized crime and 
associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and the rule of 
law.”46 As part of the initiative, the US Congress appropriated $1.6 billion 
to fund aircraft to be used by the Mexican military and to fund other 
programs, including training for police and federal and state correctional 
staff to combat drug cartels.47 The United States’ decision to send funds to 
Mexico demonstrates that the US government has an interest in the 
militarization of Mexico’s drug war and that the war is at least partly funded 
by US taxpayers.48 The Mérida Initiative also helped add to the violence, as 
Mexican security forces—which the Mérida Initiative greatly funds—are 
known to commit human rights violations, including killings, 
disappearances, and torture, in efforts to fight against cartels.49 
Another example of how the United States’ efforts to provide military 
assistance to combat cartels in Mexico has only resulted in more violence 
can be seen by the rise of a cartel known as Los Zetas. This group 
originated in the 1990s when the United States actually provided military 
                                                                                                                     
46 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF W. HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, THE MERIDA 
INITIATIVE: EXPANDING THE U.S./MEXICO PARTNERSHIP (2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2012/187119.htm. 
47 Id. 
48 GRILLO, Supra, note 26, at 10. 
49 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 31, at 246, 252. 
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training to members of a Mexican Special Forces unit assigned to combat 
the Gulf Cartel.50 Some members defected to the Gulf Cartel, becoming 
enforcers of the criminal organization, likely because the cartel offered 
more money than the Mexican Special Forces provided.51 In 2010, Los 
Zetas split from the Gulf Cartel, sparking one of the most violent periods in 
Mexico as Los Zetas fought for turf against the Gulf Cartel and their rival 
Sinaloa Cartel52  using military tactics learned through US training. Los 
Zetas now control much of the region surrounding the Gulf of Mexico up 
through Northern Mexico and are one of the most feared criminal 
organizations in the world, known for committing some of the most heinous 
crimes in the drug war.53 
President Calderón publically recognized that the demand for drugs in the 
United States has made the drug industry profitable and that the flow of 
weapons from the United States into cartel hands has made the cartels 
powerful.54 In response to the cartels’ constantly growing power, President 
Calderón believed that a militaristic approach was the right one to take, 
stating, “the government must act with the full force of the state against [the 
cartels].”55 He also stated that although the rising death toll is “painful,” 
there is “no alternative” to the military strategy he undertook as president.56 
Unfortunately, that approach has proven to lead only to more violence. 
                                                                                                                     
50 Gordon Earle et al., The 6 Most Infamous Crimes Committed By Mexico’s Zetas 




53 See Tracy Wilkinson, Leader of Zetas Drug Cartel Seized, Mexico Says, L.A. TIMES, 
July 15, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/15/world/la-fg-mexico-
zetas-cartel-20130716. 
54 GRILLO, supra note 26, at 933. 
55 Stephen Sackur, ‘No Alternative’ to Mexico’s Drug War—Says Calderon, BBC NEWS 
(Oct. 27, 2010, 10:01 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9130155.stm 
#map. 
56 Id. 
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3. United States’ Lax Gun Laws Arm Cartels  
Due to the United States’ lax gun laws, as guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment to the US Constitution, cartels are easily able to buy guns in 
the United States and smuggle them across the border back into Mexico.57 
Anyone who crosses the border knows that going into Mexico is extremely 
easy, involving minimal inspection, if any. It does not help that, in 2004, 
President George W. Bush overturned a ban on 19 different assault 
weapons58 to which cartels now have easy access and that represent 60 to 65 
percent of the guns confiscated by Mexican authorities.59 
A top Mexican national security and criminal justice official stated, “the 
significant rise in violence and the increase in the number of public officials 
killed in Mexico coincides with lifting of the assault weapons ban.”60 Many 
opposed to the violence in Mexico believe another effective strategy in 
curbing the violence would be to change gun laws in the United States to 
restrict access to guns. This presents another set of arguments that go 
beyond the scope of this paper but add another element to this complicated 
issue. 
C. Mexico’s Current Situation 
   The United States’ demand for illegal drugs, military assistance, and lax 
gun laws have thus empowered cartels and fueled the violent drug war in 
Mexico. The result is a pattern of escalating violence between the Mexican 
government and Mexican cartels, and a general climate of fear among 
people living in Mexico. 
                                                                                                                     
57 The Causes of Mexico’s Drug Violence, THE CAUSAL TRUTH (Nov. 10, 2010), 
http://www.thecasualtruth.com/story/causes-mexico’s-drug-violence. 
58 Id. 
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1. Military Successes Do Not Alleviate the Problem 
Mexican military forces have had some success in taking down top cartel 
leaders. For example, in July 2013 Mexican Naval Special Forces captured 
the head of the Zetas cartel, Miguel Angel Treviño Morales, also known by 
his alias, Z-40.61 Treviño’s capture represents the first major strike against 
the cartels for Mexico’s newly elected President, Enrique Peña Nieto, who 
probably hoped that this capture would raise his popularity among the 
public and among skeptics who doubted his policy towards the drug war.62 
Early in 2014, Mexican Naval Special Forces also captured Joaquin “El 
Chapo” Guzman, leader of the Sinaloa cartel.63 
US Attorney General Eric Holder called the arrest of “El Chapo” “a 
landmark achievement, and a victory for the citizens of both Mexico and the 
United States.” 64  Similarly, a government security affairs spokesman 
commented that the capture of Treviño “will seriously complicate . . . the 
ability of these groups . . . to exercise their criminal activities.”65 However, 
others believe that eliminating individuals like Treviño and “El Chapo” will 
make little progress toward ending the violence. As one expert said, “No 
capture of an individual will have a great impact on drug trafficking nor 
perhaps, sadly the violence.”66 Cartels have a long line of heirs ready to take 
the place of fallen leaders.67 Experts also refer to cartels as a worm, “where 
authorities can cut off pieces, but the worm lives.”68 These descriptions 
accurately describe the problem with confronting cartels through the use of 
                                                                                                                     
61 Wilkinson, supra note 18. 
62 Id. 
63 Ray Sanchez et al.,  After Years on the Run, Sinaloa Cartel Chief ‘El Chapo’ Guzman 
Arrested, CNN, (Feb. 22, 2014, 11:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/22/world/amer 
icas/mexico-cartel-chief-arrest/. 
64 Id. 




706 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
militaristic approaches. Although there may be battles in which certain 
military gains are made against the cartels, the cartels come back to 
confront their enemies with more violent force, further creating a violent 
atmosphere from which innocent bystanders in Mexico cannot escape. 
2. Climate of Fear Persists 
The cartels are also known to make theatrical displays of victims to 
create fear and intimidation, often as a message to security forces and to 
rival cartels. In March 2013 the bodies of seven men were arranged on lawn 
chairs in the state of Michoacán, some with threat messages nailed to their 
chests with ice picks.69 In May 2012 just across the US-Mexico border in 
the city of Nuevo Laredo, the bodies of four men and five women were 
found hanging off the side of the Colosio Bridge,70 which was quite an 
atrocious sight for any passerby. In the same incident, 14 headless bodies 
were found in coolers in a van.71 Hangings, beheadings, and lacerating of 
limbs are common actions cartel members take upon their victims. Live 
beheadings conducted by cartels are common on the internet, which 
contributes to the mass fear people have surrounding cartels. 72 
Unfortunately, this grim atmosphere is all too common in Mexico, 
presenting what many people view to be a fearsome and hopeless problem 
                                                                                                                     
69 Mexico’s Drug War: 7 Men Shot in Head Are Left in Plastic Chairs as 14 Killed 
Across 2 States, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 25, 2013, 4:16 AM), http://www.nydaily 
news.com/news/crime/14-killed-2-drug-plagued-mexican-states-article-1.1297760. 
70 Tracy Connor, Mexico Drug Violence: 9 Hanged, 14 Decapitated in the Border City of 




72  Will Grant, Facebook Beheading Video: Who Was Mexico’s Jane Doe? BBC.COM 
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that cannot be solved.73 However, there may be a solution that lies on the 
side of the border that fuels this problem in the first place. 
III. WASHINGTON’S AND COLORADO’S LAWS LEGALIZING 
MARIJUANA 
This section gives a brief overview of how, within a century, marijuana 
has been converted from one of the most criminalized substances in the 
United States to one that is now being legalized for recreational use. 
A. Background on Marijuana Regulation  
Marijuana is one of the most traditionally regulated drugs in the United 
States. Its regulation arose largely as a backlash against African Americans 
and Mexican laborers in the Southwest, who were largely viewed as lazy, 
prone to crime, and of lesser intelligence.74 All these characteristics were, 
and often still are, associated with marijuana use. In the South, marijuana 
was scapegoated as causing African Americans to commit murder, rape, and 
mayhem. 75  After the Mexican Revolution of 1910, a large number of 
Mexican immigrants entered the United States; Caucasians feared these 
Mexican immigrants and so tied them to marijuana use, which resulted in 
anti-drug campaigns warning against the “Marijuana Menace.”76 
Not surprisingly, state and local governments whose jurisdictions 
contained areas with large Mexican populations were the first to spearhead 
the criminalization of marijuana—starting with California, which prohibited 
the sale and possession of marijuana in 1913, followed by the city of El 
                                                                                                                     
73 See Ashley Fantz, The Mexico Drug War: Bodies for Billions, CNN (Jan. 20, 2012 
9:03 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/15/world/mexico-drug-war-essay/. 
74 Steven W. Bender, Joint Reform?: The Interplay of State, Federal, and Hemispheric 
Regulation of Recreational Marijuana and the Failed War on Drugs, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. 
REV. 359, 361–62 (2013). 
75 Id. 
76 Marijuana Timeline, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dope/etc/ 
cron.html, (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
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Paso, Texas, which did the same in 1914.77 The Great Depression of the 
1930s caused massive unemployment, which resulted in resentment towards 
Mexican immigrants among US citizens.78 The Great Depression also led to 
more public and governmental concern over marijuana. 79  By 1931, 
marijuana was outlawed in 29 states,80 with all states banning its use by 
1937.81 
In 1932, the federal government followed the states’ lead by introducing 
the Uniform State Narcotic Act, which, rather than promoting federal 
legislation, encouraged state governments to adopt the Act to boost the 
uniformity and strength of policing narcotics, including marijuana. 82  In 
1937, Congress officially criminalized marijuana with the Marijuana Tax 
Act, which created an excise tax on its use.83 Stricter federal sentencing 
laws in the 1950s84 set mandatory sentencing for drug-related offenses and 
included a minimum sentence of two to 10 years, with a fine of up to 
$20,000 for a first-time offense for marijuana possession. 85  The 1960s 
proved that these sentencing laws did nothing to eliminate the drug culture, 
including widespread use of marijuana during this period, as it was known 
for youthful rebellion and social change.86 This popularity led to backlash 
from the Nixon administration when President Richard Nixon declared a 
“War on Drugs,”87 calling drug use “public enemy number one.”88 
                                                                                                                     
77 Bender, supra, note 74, at 362. 
78 Marijuana Timeline, supra, note 76. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Boggs Act of 1951, ch. 666, 65 Stat. 767 (repealed 1970); Narcotics Control Act of 
1956, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1407 (repealed 1970). 
85 Marijuana Timeline, supra, note 76. 
86 A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy. 
org/new-solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).  
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The Federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970 classified marijuana as a 
first-tier Schedule I controlled substance, placing it in the same level as 
heroin and ecstasy, and above drugs such as opium, oxycodone, and 
methamphetamine. 89  President Nixon ignored and rejected 
recommendations by a committee he appointed to decriminalize its 
possession and distribution for personal use, and the drug remains in the 
Schedule I category to this day. 90  11 states, however, decriminalized 
marijuana possession during the period between 1973 and 1977.91 This was 
followed by the 1977 presidential election of Jimmy Carter, who won on a 
platform that included the decriminalization of marijuana.92 
After President Reagan took office in 1981, gains made to decriminalize 
marijuana ended when President Reagan continued the movement of 
criminalizing marijuana, as evidenced by high rates of incarceration during 
his presidency. Thanks to the help of the “War on Drugs,” the United States 
now holds 25 percent of the world’s prison population, even though it only 
contains five percent of the world’s total population, making it the world’s 
biggest jailer.93 In 1986, President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 
which raised federal penalties for marijuana possession and dealing, 
eventually requiring life sentences for repeat drug offenders and the death 
penalty for kingpins.94 
                                                                                                                     
88 Bender, supra, note 74, at 366. 
89 Office of Diversion Control, List of Controlled Substances, DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMIN., http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
90 See A Brief History of the Drug War, supra note 86. 
91  Id. 
92 Id. 
93 The Prison Crisis, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/safe-communities-fair-sentences/pris 
on-crisis (last visited Dec. 1, 2013 at 10:50 PM); Kathleen Miles, Just How Much The 
War On Drugs Impacts Our Overcrowded Prisons, In One Chart, 
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Apr. 3, 2014, 11:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/ 
03/10/war-on-drugs-prisons-infographic_n_4914884.html.  
94 This act particularly targeted users of crack-cocaine, a smokable version of powder 
cocaine, by creating a 100-to-1 sentencing disparity:  
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On the Mexican side of the border, the criminalization of marijuana in the 
United States creates a demand for the drug through illegal means. Hence, 
marijuana provides business for criminal insurgent groups like the cartels. 
On the US side, the criminalization of marijuana contributes to mass 
incarceration, hinders opportunities of individuals, and disproportionally 
affects communities of color. 95  In recent years, however, opinions 
surrounding marijuana use have changed, as can be seen by the large 
number of states that have decriminalized it and legalized its medical and 
even recreational use, particularly in the states of Washington and 
Colorado. 
B. Shifting Marijuana Policy: Why Washington and Colorado Legalized 
Marijuana 
In the 1960s and 1970s, marijuana use in the United States became less 
associated solely with African Americans and Mexican laborers, and 
became more widespread among the white population.96 By 2009, almost 
half of high school seniors in the United States and 100 million US 
residents had smoked marijuana, with widespread use among middle-class 
whites. 97  Marijuana’s increased popularity among middle-class white 
individuals in the past half-century has led to its increased 
decriminalization. While the federal government’s marijuana policy has 
                                                                                                                     
In what’s known as the 100-to-1 rule, federal law mandates a 10-year sentence 
for anyone caught with 50 grams of crack, about the weight of a candy bar. To 
get a comparable sentence, a dealer selling powdered cocaine would have to be 
caught with 5,000 grams, enough to fill a briefcase.  
100-to-1 Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/ 
opinion/15thu3.html?_r=0. 
95 See Michelle Alexander, The War on Drugs and the New Jim Crow, 17 RACE, 
POVERTY, AND THE ENVIRON., A J. FOR SOC. AND ENVIRONM’L. JUST., no.1 (2010), 
available at http://reimaginerpe.org/20years/alexander. 
96 Bender, supra note 74, at 368–69. 
97 Id. at 369. 
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remained the same, states have taken the lead to decriminalize marijuana. In 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, states began decriminalizing marijuana by 
reducing penalties for small possessions from felonies to misdemeanors.98 
1. Widespread State Medical Marijuana Laws 
One of the clearest signs of the decriminalization of marijuana and 
increase in marijuana tolerance, is its widespread legalized medical use 
among states. Marijuana is known to be an effective treatment for 
symptoms of cancer, AIDS, multiple sclerosis, glaucoma, and epilepsy.99 It 
is also known to effectively treat anorexia, spasticity, and migraines.100 
Marijuana is also used for pain relief, control of nausea and vomiting, and 
appetite stimulation.101 A strong and early example of marijuana’s medical 
potential can been seen by the federal government’s Marijuana Tax Act of 
1937, which actually allowed doctors to prescribe marijuana for certain 
medical conditions.102  This recognition of marijuana’s medical potential 
was, of course, done away with when the federal government designated 
marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance in 1970. 103  Since then, 
however, marijuana’s medical potential has been alluded to in various 
reports and experiments.104 
California became the first state to legalize the medical use of marijuana 
in 1996, when voters enacted Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act, 
with a majority vote of 56 percent.105 Since then, 18 states and the District 
of Columbia have followed California’s lead in legalizing the medical use 
                                                                                                                     
98 Id. 
99 Should Marijuana Be a Medical Option?, PROCON, http://medicalmarijuana.procon. 
org (last updated Sept. 19, 2014, 1:31 PM). 
100 Bender, supra, note 74, at 372. 
101 Id. at 371. 
102 Marijuana Timeline, supra note 76. 
103 Id. 
104 Bender, supra note 74, at 371. 
105 Id. 
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of marijuana, mostly through voter initiatives rather than legislation, and 
requiring patients to obtain a physician’s recommendation to use marijuana 
that can be home grown or purchased at dispensaries.106 The movement 
towards legalizing medical marijuana since the 1990s represents a large 
shift in mainstream public opinion regarding its use because a movement to 
legalize marijuana would have been unimaginable just a generation earlier. 
2. Shift in Opinions Regarding Marijuana Use and Law Enforcement at 
the Public Official Level 
Another example of the rapid shift of marijuana policy is how public 
officials have responded to questions regarding their own marijuana use. In 
1992, when asked whether he had smoked marijuana, President Bill Clinton 
admitted that he had experimented with marijuana a time or two and said 
that he “didn’t like it, didn’t inhale, and never tried it again.”107 It is not 
surprising that Clinton phrased his answer in this way because, at the time, 
marijuana use still carried a strong stigma and because the Clinton 
Administration took a hard stance against marijuana use. 108  President 
Barack Obama, in contrast, mentioned in 2006, “When I was a kid, I 
inhaled frequently. That was the point.”109 These two contrasting statements 
reflect how opinions regarding marijuana use have changed in the span of 
less than 15 years. 
Recently, officials have made efforts to reduce penalties for marijuana 
use, possession, and distribution. Although distribution of medical 
marijuana is a still a federal offense, in October 2009 the Department of 
                                                                                                                     
106 Id. at 372. 
107 2013 Top 50 Most influential Marijuana Users, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, 
http://www.mpp.org/outreach/top-50-marijuana-users-list.html?page=1 (last visited Oct. 
11, 2014). 
108 Medical Marijuana Policy in the United States, HUNTINGTON’S OUTREACH PROJECT 
OF EDUCATION, STANFORD (May 15, 2012), https://www.stanford.edu/group/hopes/cgi-
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Justice (DOJ), headed by Attorney General Holder, sent a memo to federal 
prosecutors to encourage them to refrain from prosecuting people who 
distribute medical marijuana in accordance with state law, 110  further 
evidencing that, even at the highest level of law enforcement, the nation is 
taking a step back with regard to enforcing federal law regarding marijuana 
usage. 
In 2007, prior to the legalization of recreational marijuana use in 
Colorado, voters in Denver approved an initiative that deemed marijuana 
the city police’s lowest priority. 111  Similarly, in 2012, the Seattle City 
Attorney announced that enforcement of laws pertaining to marijuana 
possession was the lowest priority of the Seattle City Attorney’s Office 
Criminal Division and Seattle Police Department, stating, “I don’t prosecute 
simple marijuana possession cases.”112 
3. Shift in Popular Opinion on Marijuana 
For the first time in more than 40 years since this issue was first polled, 
US residents favor legalizing marijuana usage.113 A national survey found 
that 52 percent support the legalization of marijuana while 45 percent do 
not, an increase of 11 percentage points since 2010.114 This shift in popular 
opinion regarding marijuana marks a substantial change from 1969, when 
just 12 percent were in favor of its legalization and 84 percent were 
opposed.115 Young voters—those born since 1980, now between the ages of 
18 and 34—are the strongest group in favor of its legalization with 65 
                                                                                                                     
110 State Medical Marijuana Laws, NCSL (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx. 
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percent in favor,116 reflecting that in the coming years, as younger voters 
increase in voting turnout, the issue of marijuana legalization will likely 
shift more rapidly in favor of its legalization. All age groups polled are now 
more in favor of marijuana’s legalization than ever before, including 
Generation X with 54 percent, the Baby Boomers with 50 percent, and the 
Silent Generation with 32 percent.117 
The shift in public opinion on marijuana has been so significant that 
recreational marijuana is now legal in four states and the District of 
Columbia. Washington and Colorado captured national attention in the 
2012 election by legalizing recreational marijuana use. 118  Voters in 
Washington approved I-502 by 55.7 percent,119 legalizing possession of up 
to one ounce of loose leaf marijuana, 16 ounces of a solid product, and 72 
ounces of marijuana infused liquid for adults aged 21 and over.120 Likewise, 
55 percent of Colorado voters approved Amendment 64, the Regulate 
Marijuana Like Alcohol Act of 2012, legalizing possession of up to one 
ounce of marijuana and the cultivation of up to six cannabis plants.121 
Because the legislation of legalized marijuana is new, states like 
Washington and Colorado face the problem of having no clear model for 
legislation, leaving states with the ongoing task of testing which methods 
will work and which will not. The next section will discuss what holes 
legislation in Washington and Colorado may have left for cartels to fill in 




118 See Marc Fisher, Marijuana’s Rising Acceptance Comes After Many Failures. Is It 
Now Legalization’s Time?, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.co 
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IV. CLEARING THE SMOKE: CRAFTING MARIJUANA LEGISLATION TO 
TAKE OUT THE CARTELS 
States around the nation are watching how Washington and Colorado 
regulate the use of marijuana. In particular, California, a state that has been 
central to marijuana policy in the nation, is watching closely how the 
aforementioned states go about legislating marijuana. The American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) announced a panel, headed by Lieutenant 
Governor Gavin Newsom of California, established to draft a possible ballot 
item for 2016 to legalize marijuana in California.122 As more states and 
countries consider legalizing marijuana, the more they must consider the 
implications of their legislation on the drug war in Mexico. The following 
section examines how the current legislation in Washington and Colorado, 
as it currently exists, might have little influence to hamper cartels, followed 
by possible solutions to this problem. 
A. Licensing Obstacles 
One of the largest obstacles in running a legal recreational marijuana 
business is obtaining a license. Merging licensing requirements between 
medical and recreational dispensaries, loosening the initial requirements for 
licensee hopefuls, and increasing the number of licenses issued will likely 
contribute to a decrease in black market marijuana business. Although this 
section focuses primarily on Washington law, Colorado has similar 
licensing regulations. Under Washington’s I-502, there are three separate 
tiers for individuals involved in the recreational sale of marijuana:  
producer, processor, and retailer.123 Each must be licensed under the rules 
                                                                                                                     
122 Eliza Gray, New Laws Chart Course for Marijuana Legalization: How Colorado and 
Washington State Govern Their Legal Pot Markets Will Be A Test Case for the Rest of the 
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set out by the Washington State Liquor Control Board.124  Each license 
application fee is $250 and each renewal fee is $1,000.125 Though a licensed 
producer may additionally hold a processor license, neither a producer nor a 
processor may hold a retailer license.126 Each applicant must go through a 
thorough criminal background check and must pay for fingerprinting fees 
(along with other background check fees), which are submitted to the 
Washington State Patrol and FBI for comparison to the applicant’s criminal 
records. 127  Financers are also subject to criminal investigation and the 
Liquor Control Board conducts financial investigations to verify that the 
source of funds are used for the “acquisition and startup of the business, the 
applicants’ right to the real and personal property, and to verify the true 
party(ies) of interest.”128 
Additionally, applicants must also submit operating plans, must notify the 
board of any substantial change to the plans, and must be current on tax 
obligations in Washington. 129  Applicants must also have resided in 
Washington State for at least three months prior to submitting an 
application. 130  Although there are many good reasons for having this 
requirement, applicants for black market marijuana businesses connected to 
Mexican cartels certainly do not have to go through these tedious 






128 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314.55.020 (2013). 
129 Operating plans are meant to demonstrate that the applicant is qualified to hold the 
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In addition, limits on the numbers of licenses issued and restrictions on 
retail location and advertisement hinder the growth of recreational 
marijuana businesses. The number of retail licenses is limited and is 
determined by using a formula that distributes the number of locations 
according to the local population.131 Retailers cannot be setup within 1,000 
feet of an elementary or secondary school playground, recreation center, 
child care center, public park, public transit center, or arcade where minors 
are allowed to enter; and are only allowed to sell marijuana, marijuana-
infused products, and marijuana paraphernalia.132 Retailer licenses will not 
be approved for locations within another business. 133  In terms of 
advertising, retailers cannot have more than one 1,600 square inch sign 
bearing the business’s name, cannot display products on window fronts, and 
cannot advertise within 1,000 feet of the locations listed above where 
retailers cannot set up stores.134 
The process to convert a medical marijuana outlet into a recreational 
marijuana outlet seems overly complicated considering medical marijuana 
outlets are already heavily regulated. Medical marijuana outlets that want to 
become recreational outlets still have to go through the same application 
process as any other potential applicants.135 Should they obtain a license, 
these stores would only be allowed to sell marijuana purchased from the 
legal recreation system and cannot mingle medical and recreational 
marijuana.136 
Finally, applicants cannot actually get their license until after a final 
inspection, after they have invested hundreds of thousands of dollars on 
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equipment, 137  transformers, and leases, posing a “cart-before-the-horse” 
kind of situation considering someone who does all this may not know 
whether or not they will get a license.138 
Since black market marijuana businesses do not face these regulatory 
obstacles, states considering marijuana legalization may want to loosen 
regulations to help neutralize this advantage. Particularly, it seems 
counterproductive to require already existing medical marijuana 
dispensaries in Washington State to go through the process of obtaining a 
license through the same set of requirements as someone who is not already 
licensed to sell medical marijuana. One of the reasons this requirement 
exists is because, in Washington, the Washington State Liquor Control 
Board governs recreational marijuana whereas medical marijuana is 
governed by the Department of Health.139 If the two were to merge certain 
requirements so as to not recreate the wheel, it would allow for easier access 
into both markets for those looking to be involved in selling both medical 
and recreational marijuana. 
Easier access to licenses is essential for individuals looking to be 
involved in the legal marijuana business and hence to compete more 
effectively against cartel businesses. Another possible solution for this may 
be to increase the number of licenses. There are 334 spots available for 
2,000 applicants, and in the City of Seattle, there are 411 retail hopefuls for 
                                                                                                                     
137 Equipment includes but is not limited to surveillance equipment, bulletproof glass, 
ventilation materials, dehumidifiers, air movers, and air conditioners. See Martine Kaste, 
All Things Considered: Even Where It’s Legal, Pot Producers Weigh the Business Risks, 
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (May 7, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/03/06/173460550/ 
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just 21 spots.140 This 10–17 percent chance of approval causes a lot of 
uncertainty for those seeking licenses. Certainty for licensing applicants is 
important considering the commitments and investments that must be made 
by potential applicants. For example, those seeking a retail license must 
have a space leased as part of their application requirement.141 To make 
initial investments in space and materials less risky, perhaps the application 
requirements can have some preliminary requirements that allow for people 
to, after passing the initial stage of their application process, move along 
and invest more with the guarantee that their investments will not go to 
waste. For example, uncertainty could be decreased if applicants are 
required to have a business space leased and ready to go, but are not 
required to invest in expensive equipment until after they are guaranteed a 
license. 
Also, the number of licenses should be increased to almost double, at 
around 600 licenses, to allow for more people seeking to enter the 
marijuana business do so. This number will allow for almost double the 
amount of licenses while keeping it at a limit, as skeptics will likely not be 
on board with issuing an unlimited number of licenses. 
It is important to relax the process of granting marijuana licenses. If 
current regulations prevent legal marijuana businesses from increasing and 
eventually replacing black market businesses, then a black market will still 
exist in Washington and Colorado and will keep cartels alive. The next 
issue that may prevent legal marijuana businesses from replacing black 
market businesses is the issue of whether legal marijuana can be sold at 
competitive prices with black market marijuana. That depends on tax. 
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B. High Taxes and Caps on the Amounts to Be Sold 
Beyond licensing obstacles, high taxes and caps on amounts sold also 
limit the legal marijuana market. One of the selling points on legalizing 
marijuana is the potential gain to be made on its taxation. Consumers spend 
an estimated $30 billion dollars per year on marijuana nationally. 142  In 
Washington, state budget officials estimate that Washington could 
potentially gain $134 million in tax revenue between 2015 and 2017.143 
Washington imposes a “25 percent tax on each of the three parts of 
marijuana production: producer to processor, processor to retailer, and 
retailer to customer,”144 consisting of a 10 percent sales tax and a 15 percent 
excise tax. 145 In Colorado, marijuana is subject to a 2.9 percent sales tax, a 
10 percent state tax on marijuana sales, and a 15 percent excise tax, with a 
total 29 percent tax rate.146 
Experts say that finding the “sweet spot” for taxation is key because 
legalized marijuana needs to be competitive with illegal marijuana so as not 
to push business back into the black market.147 These taxes have made it so 
that the cost per ounce of high-grade marijuana from retailors is more than 
double the cost from illegal drug dealers.148 The price for an ounce of high-
grade marijuana sold legally in Colorado goes for about $400,149 whereas in 
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the black market, high-grade marijuana goes for about $237 in Colorado.150 
Additionally, visitors to Colorado can only buy a quarter of an ounce and 
private citizens are limited to growing six plants. 151  In Washington, 
changing the high tax rate would have to come through the legislature and, 
during the first two years of the initiative, would require a two-thirds 
majority.152 
Washington has also placed a cap on the Washington market as to the 
amount of marijuana to be produced at 80 metric tons: 40 for useable 
marijuana and 40 for other marijuana products.153 This cap is in place for 
several reasons. The main reasoning is to avoid having a surplus of 
marijuana that can be illegally smuggled into other states—a major concern 
of the federal government.154 Another reason for placing a cap is because, 
when too much marijuana floods the market, retailers tend to keep prices 
low, incentivizing them to disregard certain quality and safety measures.155 
On the other hand, there are also arguments against imposing caps on the 
retail marijuana market. Critics on cap placement argue that “by limiting the 
legal market, they are enriching the illegal market.” 156  Any marijuana 
provided to other states will likely come from cartels, keeping them in 
business and keeping the violence in Mexico alive. Experts also say that 
marijuana consumption in 2013 was greater than 85 metric tons, though 
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because of the difficulty in measuring consumption, that estimate is likely 
an understatement of actual consumption.157 
States implementing marijuana legislation may want to consider lowering 
taxes and eliminating caps on amounts sold because of the challenge they 
pose for legal marijuana businesses and the advantage they give to their 
illegal counterparts. One way to provide lower prices for marijuana would 
be to lower the taxes on marijuana. A tax lower than 25–30 percent is a 
possible solution that would significantly reduce the price of marijuana and 
would incentivize potential marijuana buyers to purchase legal marijuana 
rather than illegal marijuana. Potential losses in state revenue from reduced 
taxes could be alleviated with an elimination of caps on amounts sold, or at 
least an increase on existing caps. The increase in sales as a result of the 
increase or removal of caps will result in more tax revenue overall. 
Opponents argue that the removal or liberalization of caps may allow for 
illegal interstate smuggling of marijuana. Though this may be true, some 
might agree that it is better for marijuana to be illegally smuggled into states 
where it is illegal from legal growers in Washington or Colorado than from 
black market sources stemming from Mexican cartels, as these types of 
transactions will not likely lead to the amount of violence seen in Mexico’s 
Drug War. It is also possible that as time passes, and if more states legalize 
marijuana use, competition from other legalized states may reduce the 
amount of tax Washington and Colorado put on their marijuana.158 Only 
time will tell. 
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With an industry this young, it is difficult to tell what will happen with 
regard to how regulations such as licensing and taxes will pan out. Another 
interesting area to look out for is how state law regarding marijuana will 
interact with federal law. 
C. Federal Involvement 
In addition to the obstacles marijuana businesses face at the state level 
are the uncertain risks of federal intervention in the marijuana business as 
marijuana is still illegal under federal law. 159  Individuals may still be 
prosecuted if the federal government chooses to do so,160 as federal law 
preempts the laws in Washington and Colorado. The US Supreme Court 
decision in Gonzales v. Raich held that the federal government could still 
criminalize the manufacture, distribution, or possession of medical 
marijuana even when individual states have legalized its medical use.161 
This holding applies to Washington and Colorado for legal recreational use, 
creating uncertainty as to how federal enforcement will approach these 
measures.162 After the passage of the laws in Washington and Colorado, the 
DOJ released a statement saying that the laws would have no effect on the 
federal ban on marijuana and that marijuana would still remain a Schedule I 
controlled substance.163 
At the same time, the Obama administration has stated that it will not 
challenge Washington’s and Colorado’s laws so long as those states abide 
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by the federal rule involving the sale and distribution of marijuana.164 When 
asked by Barbara Walters whether the laws were a major concern of his 
administration, President Obama responded, “We’ve got bigger fish to fry,” 
and added, “It would not make sense for us to see a top priority as going 
after recreational users in states that have determined that it’s legal.”165 In 
August 2013 Deputy Attorney General James Cole released a memo 
encouraging US attorneys to use prosecutorial discretion in enforcing 
priorities, noting that marijuana-related activity in compliance with 
Washington and Colorado laws is less likely to threaten the DOJ’s 
objectives. 166  However, the memo also asserted the power of federal 
prosecutors to enforce the federal law in Washington and Colorado, 
including those acting in compliance with the states’ recreational use 
laws.167 
The mixed signals from the Obama Administration and the DOJ as to 
their policy on marijuana regulation make potential marijuana businesses 
uncertain about the future.168 This poses yet another obstacle for marijuana 
businesses in compliance with state law looking for a future in marijuana. 
Black market businesses run by the cartels are used to operating under 
illegal conditions and have established networks giving them an advantage 
over businesses coming into an uncertain atmosphere. Marijuana 
prosecution is also determined by the administration running the executive 
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branch. The Obama administration and Attorney General Holder have 
clearly been lenient with regard to enforcing marijuana policies. This does 
not mean that the next administration will take the same approach. In order 
to curb that potential, some concrete policies ought to be implemented to 
prevent future prosecution by the federal government over states where 
marijuana is legal. 
A good place to start in terms of untangling the conflict between state and 
federal law is to remove marijuana from Schedule I of the CSA. As a 
Schedule I drug, marijuana remains a drug that is a high priority for the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which rejected a proposal in 2002 to 
remove marijuana as a Schedule I drug.169 Despite evidence to the contrary, 
the DEA asserts that marijuana maintains the characteristics necessary to be 
classified as a Schedule I drug.170  While some argue that it should be 
removed off the CSA altogether, a more feasible solution in today’s split 
political environment would be to lower it to a Schedule II or III drug so as 
to lower its potential for being sought after by the DEA.171 In April 2014 
Attorney General Holder stated that he would be willing to work with 
Congress to “reschedule” marijuana and take it off the list of what the 
government considers the most dangerous drugs. 172  By declassifying 
marijuana as one of the most dangerous drugs, the federal government will 
open up the way for legal marijuana businesses to operate without as much 
fear of being intercepted by the DEA, which can also focus its resources on 
targeting the more dangerous drug cartels. 
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A possible solution to resolve the conflict between federal rules 
outlawing marijuana use and states that have legalized its use would be to 
create an exemption from federal enforcement in states that have legalized 
it.173 As discussed above, the CSA places marijuana as a top priority for 
federal drug enforcement, and an exemption such as this is another possible 
solution for this uncertain dilemma.174 This collaborative effort would ease 
tensions that may prevent individuals from starting a business out of fear 
that the federal government may intervene in their operation. This too 
would pave a way for legal marijuana businesses to more freely conduct 
business, and, as a result, further trump cartel influence in the United States. 
While the rescheduling of marijuana or the implementation of an 
exception would have to come through Congress, it is also possible for the 
president to implement an executive order to reschedule or create an 
exception. Although executive orders face the risk of being overturned by 
Congress, the US Supreme Court, or the next executive administration, they 
tend to remain after they have been issued.175 Should President Obama issue 
an executive order on this issue, it would serve as a movement forward in 
protecting legal marijuana businesses, giving them more mobility to 
eventually replace black market marijuana businesses. 
D. The Other Side: Counterarguments 
It is hard to determine exactly how US marijuana legalization would hurt 
the cartels, in part because we do not have perfect numbers on how drug 
traffickers profit from marijuana use in each of the 50 states.176 It is widely 
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accepted that marijuana accounts for at least 50 percent of cartel profits, at 
least for some cartels such as the Sinaloa Cartel. 177  Assuming it were 
legalized in the United States, that still leaves cartels with the 40 percent 
profit they make from selling other drugs such as methamphetamine, 
cocaine, brown powder, and heroine.178 That is why states that do legalize 
marijuana need to carefully craft their legislation so as to maximize the 
effects it has on cartels. 
Supporters of strict licensing regulation argue that licensing is necessary 
for purposes such as preventing criminals from being involved in the 
marijuana business. While thorough background checks should be 
implemented for this purpose, this purpose should not be used to justify a 
limit on the number of licenses issued. Increases in the number of 
applications granted will eventually allow for a replacement of black market 
businesses. While background checks will certainly weed out certain 
individuals, chances are that in the abundance of applicants, there are plenty 
of applicants that will pass the background checks and can lawfully operate 
a marijuana operation. 
Some argue that extracting as much revenue as possible from taxes is 
necessary to help fund public education, public works, or other public 
institutions. While an increase in tax revenue is certainly helpful for state 
economies, policy makers must consider that legal businesses still need to 
compete with illegal businesses. In some cases, legal marijuana costs almost 
twice as much as illegal marijuana. By increasing or eliminating caps on the 
total amounts of marijuana that can be sold, states can lower the tax rate and 
still receive a similar amount of tax revenue. 
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Another argument against loosening marijuana regulation is to prevent 
higher numbers of drug use. Although most should be able to agree that 
decreased drug or marijuana use is always better than not, demand for it 
will likely exist whether or not it is legal. This is exemplified by the fact 
that it has increased in enormous popularity over the past 50 years while it 
was illegal for most of that time and in most places. Also, the proposals 
presented in this article are not meant to increase the overall usage of 
marijuana, but rather to regulate its legal manufacture and distribution in 
such a way that strategically ousts black market marijuana businesses. 
It is clear that a movement to legalize and normalize marijuana use is 
gaining traction in the United States, and by keeping marijuana as a 
Schedule I drug, the federal government is only holding back the growth of 
this movement. While many people take different stances as to why they do 
or do not support the legalization of marijuana, the placement of marijuana 
as a Schedule I drug seems counterintuitive and diverts federal attention 
away from what many people agree are more dangerous drugs and drug 
businesses. Policy makers must keep in mind that legal marijuana 
businesses face the challenge of competing with the black market supplied 
mostly by the Mexican cartels. The existence of the cartels has caused a 
bloody war in Mexico that has cost tens of thousands of lives. Surely this 
fact must strongly influence the minds of policy makers when thinking of 
the best way to regulate marijuana. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mexico is currently facing a grave challenge that threatens the 
livelihoods of its citizens. In some locations, individuals cannot even walk 
outside without fear of the violence that is currently strangling Mexico. The 
drug cartels have risen as enormous forces that compete directly with each 
other and with federal military forces. This has resulted in a bloody war that 
has plagued Mexico for almost a decade. 
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Fortunately, there is hope. The main supply of money for cartels is the 
sales they make in the illegal marijuana market in the United States. States, 
just like Washington, Colorado, and most recently, Oregon, Alaska, and the 
District of Columbia are now beginning to legalize marijuana for 
recreational use. Other states are hoping to follow in those footsteps by 
doing the same in upcoming elections. However, legalizing its use and 
placing tight regulations that prevent legal marijuana businesses from being 
competitive with illegal businesses may keep the cartels in business and 
continue to drag out the drug war. Because of this, any state that has 
legalized or is planning to legalize recreational marijuana in the future must 
consider policies that allow legal marijuana businesses to drive their illegal 
counterparts out of business. This article advocates that such policies ought 
to consider loosening their licensing requirements, reducing taxes on 
recreational marijuana, increasing the amount of marijuana that can be sold, 
and teasing out any potential state and federal tangles. Steps such as these 
will hopefully lead to an end to the violence that has plagued Mexico for 
almost a decade. 
 
